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Résumé / Abstract 
 
Cette  ￩tude  montre  que  la  volont￩  d'emprunter  pour  s’instruire  varie  consid￩rablement  chez  certains 
étudiants  issus  de  milieu  socio-économique  faible,  des  Premières  nations,  et  les  étudiants  de  première 
génération. 1248 étudiants ont participé à une enquête, une évaluation de leur niveau de connaissances 
numériques  et  ont  pris part  à  des  décisions  expérimentales. Pendant  ces  séances, les  étudiants  ont été 
confront￩s  à  une  s￩rie  de  d￩cisions  binaires  r￩mun￩r￩es  :  bourses  vs  dollars,  pr￪ts  d’￩tudes  pour  le 
postsecondaire vs dollars, des décisions intertemporelles et des décisions risquées. Les décisions binaires 
rémunérées impliquant un arbitrage entre des dollars et divers types d'aide financière, nous ont permis de 
générer un coût par dollar du financement de l'éducation (bourses, prêts, mélanges de prêts et de bourses). 
Les prix pour les différents types de financement de l'éducation se chevauchent de manière substantielle 
pour permettre de distinguer clairement l'impact de l'aversion pour les prêts sur la décision de prendre ou 
non l’option d’une aide financi￨re pour poursuivre des ￩tudes postsecondaires. Les résultats montrent que 
plusieurs facteurs influencent les décisions des sujets sur le financement de leur éducation, mais l'influence 
la plus importante est le prix en dollars des subventions à l'éducation. Les participants ont été légèrement 
influencés par la forme de financement (subvention ou prêt), mais aucune preuve d'aversion pour les prêts 
n’a ￩t￩ d￩cel￩e. 
 
Mots clés : choix intertemporels, expériences sur le terrain, attitudes vis-à-vis des 
risques, l'aversion aux pr￪ts d’￩tudes. 
 
 
Evidence is presented on whether the willingness to borrow for education varies significantly among some 
at-risk students: low SES levels, First Nations, and first generation students. 1248 students participated in 
a survey, a numeracy assessment and took part in experimental decisions.  During these sessions, students 
were  presented  with  a  series  of  paid  binary  decisions:  bursaries  vs.  cash,  loans  for  postsecondary 
education studies vs. cash, intertemporal decisions and risky decisions. The paid binary decisions involved 
trade-offs between cash and various types of student financial aid, allowing us to generate a cost per dollar 
of educational financing (grants, loans, mixtures of loans and grants).  Prices for the various types of 
educational financing overlapped substantially in order to more clearly distinguish the impact of loan 
aversion on the decision to take up financial assistance to pursue PSE.  Results show that several factors 
influence the subjects’ decisions about education financing but the most prominent influence was the price 
of educational subsidies. Participants were marginally sensitive to the form of financing (grant or loan), 
with no evidence of systematic loan aversion being detected. 
 
Keywords: Intertemporal choice, field experiments, risk attitudes, loans aversion. 
 
Codes JEL : C93, D91, D81 
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Despite Canada having one of the world’s best-educated populations, numerous rationales 
have been presented to support the continued expansion and broadening of  postsecondary 
education (PSE) participation. Not only do recent federal and provincial occupational projections 
suggest that future jobs will overwhelmingly require candidates with some form of PSE, the 
evidence on earnings premium and private rates of return to PSE provide indications that labour 
market can still absorb large quantities of PSE graduates.  
It is now standard to argue that increasing participation among groups that are typically 
under-represented, such as students from low-income families, students with no history of post-
secondary education in their families, those living outside of commuting distance to University 
and Aboriginal students, will require strategies to overcome complex and interrelated barriers 
as difference in abilities to learn, literacy skills and financial barriers. A thorough review of all 
potential explanations for the under-representation of some groups in university is beyond the 
scope of this paper.  Instead, our study is mainly concerned with one type of financial barrier: 
loan aversion. Loan aversion is not likely to be a serious concern for potential PSE participants 
who have the means to pay for PSE. The major concern is that individuals be unwilling to take 
out loans to finance their PSE even though they know PSE represents a good investment. 
If loan aversion is an important barrier in the decision to invest in education, it would have 
profound  consequences  on  the  way  student  financial  aid  is  delivered.    In  Canada,  a  post-
secondary  student  in  need  of  financial  aid  must  first  qualify  for  student  loan  before  being 
considered for a need-based grant. If the decision to pursue PSE study for certain groups is 
affected  by  such  personal  characteristics  as  loan  aversion  or  aversion  to  debt,  this  would  
 
 
certainly suggest a need for changes in existing policies. For instance, consideration could be 
given to the decoupling of loans and grants.
1 
The possible importance of loan aversion as a barrier has been addressed in a few studies 
using surveys and interview data. For example, Callender and Jackson (2005) found that  lower 
income subjects are more likely to be debt averse, while Rasmussen (2006), based on a small set 
of interviews, suggested that income -contingent loans are not likely to solve the problem, 
because attitudes toward debt often vary widely by cultural background and income.  
Aside from research done with traditional empirical aggregate or survey data, a few 
experimental studies have been completed on the decision to invest in education and on loan 
aversion.    In  a  large  experiment  conducted  by  SRDC  and  CIR ANO,  Eckel,  Johnson  and 
Montmarquette (2007) found that, overall, controlling for other factors, aversion to debt is not 
an important factor in determining whether subjects (adults aged 18 to 55) will take up higher 
education financing.  Furthermore, subjects who carry heavy debt loads were more willing than 
others to take on additional debt to finance higher education. However, while there was no 
evidence that entire subgroups were debt-averse, the original study noted that both high school 
students  and  po st-secondary  students  presented  sizeable  probabilities  of  debt  aversion 
(Johnson and al, 2003). 
Experimental techniques remain the best approach to assess the impact of loan aversion on 
the decision to take -up financial aid to purse PSE. Experimental manip ulation allows the 
research to carefully control for many factors in the decision-making process and varying those 
of interest.  In this study, we will use an experiment to offer a set of financial incentives to the 
population of interest and observe their   revealed preferences for PSE under pre -specified 
conditions.  
                                                           
1 See Berger, Motte, and Parkin (2009) for a full discussion of the potential advantages of such change.   
 
 
The next section details the experimental design that will be used to find out about loan 
aversion. The third section outlines the implementation of the experiment in the field. The 
fourth and fifth sections investigate the demand for educational subsidies.  The sixth section 
focuses on the presence or absence of loan aversion. The last section concludes. 
II. Design 
This study is designed to answer the fundamental question, “Does the willingness to borrow 
vary  significantly  among  types  of  students?”    In  this  section  we  outline  the  experimental 
techniques that will be used to find out if loan aversion does represent a barrier to accessing PSE 
for certain under-represented groups.  
Choosing between different types of financial aid 
The  distinguishing  feature  of  this  study  is  the  use  of  experimental  measures  to  reveal 
differences in the willingness to take up financial aid depending on different forms used to 
provide this aid. We first construct a series of decisions involving choices between different 
types and levels of financial aid and some cash alternative. As the amount of implicit subsidy 
embodied in each type and level of aid varies, we can compare this implicit subsidy with the 
cash alternative offered and determine a cost per dollar of subsidy for each decision. We use 
these decisions to distinguish pricing from types of financing.
2  
We use a within subjects design where participants are presented with a series of binary 
choices: grants vs. cash, student loans vs. cash, etc. Within subjects design means that each 
subject acts as his or her own counterfactual. All subjects are presented with the full set of 
decisions and are paid for one of their choices, randomly selected, at the end of the session. This 
                                                           
2 The study described here is similar in design to the study conducted earlier by SRDC and CIRANO for the Canada 
Student Loans (CSL) Branch of Human Resources Development Canada, with the exception of three critical design 
changes. The first and most important difference is that this study has a far more comprehensive parameterization of 
the loans and grants decisions. The second difference is that this study was conducted solely on students in secondary 
school, whereas the CSL study had a very small high school sample, merely for comparison purposes. And lastly, the 
CSL study was done on an individual decision-making basis. In the current study, parents were provided with an 
information packet so that they had an opportunity to discuss with their children their expectations regarding the 
choices their children will be asked to make.  
 
 
allows a comparison of what the subject would do in each situation. Since the subjects know 
they will be paid for one of their decision, but they do not know which one before the end of the 
session, they have the incentive to reveal what they really want for all decisions.  
An example of an educational subsidy choice is pictured in Figure 2.1 below. This particular 
example offers a choice between a $1000 grant and $25 cash. Given that these subsidies are 
only available for a limited time (two years from the date of the study), if a participant has no 
interest in acquiring additional education, he or she will opt for the cash. The complete set of 
decisions presented to participants is available upon request.  
Figure 2.1: Example of Educational Subsidy Choice 
You must choose A or B: 
   
CHOICE A   
   
CHOICE B   
   
$$ one week from today  
   
FULL-TIME  







   
 $1000 GRANT  
 
Four subsidy types were used in the choices provided to participants: Grants, Loans, Hybrid 
Loans (½ loan, ½ grant), and Income Contingent Hybrid Loans. The grants varied from $500 - 
$4000, the loans varied from $1000 - $4000 and the Hybrids varied from $800 - $4000. Cash 
alternatives varied from $25 - $700. These decisions are summarized in Table 2.1.   
 
 
To participants in the study, accepting a grant, loan or hybrid is not free. They must pay a 
price, which is the cost per dollar of subsidy accepted. No matter what the subsidy type is, 
participants have to give up a certain amount of cash.  For instance, if they choose a $1000 
Grant rather than a $25 cash alternative (Decision 124), their cost would be $25 /$1000 or 2.5 
cents per dollar of subsidy. If they choose a loan rather than the cash alternative, they have 
given up the cash alternative but gotten the use of the subsidized loan for approximately 5 ½ 
years,  interest  free.  If  participants  choose  a  $1000  loan  rather  than  $300  cash  alternative 
(Decision 112), the cost of the subsidy would roughly include the $300 they gave up to get the 
loan, plus the inflation depreciated payback at the end of approximately 5 ½ years, less the 
value of subsidized interest for approximately 5 ½ years. In other words, the cost per dollar of 
loan subsidy would be [Cash + PV of the loan – subsidized interest] / Subsidy amount. For 
decision 112, it would be [300 + (1000-141.86)-269.14]/1000 = $0.917.
3 
Table 2.1: Educational Finance Decisions 
Decision 
number 


















































































































































































                                                           
3 For this table and the computations presented in this report, for loans, a 2.5% inflation rate, 3% real interest rate, and 
5 ½ years of interest subsidy were assumed. This is slightly different than the field implementation of a 2.5% inflation 































































































































































*These decisions were presented only once in the study. They are repeated here to 
demonstrate potential groupings or comparisons of decision arrays.  
  The cost per dollar of subsidy must overlap substantially for loans and grants in order to be 
able to more clearly distinguish the impact of loan aversion. For instance, if a participant favours 
one type of subsidy versus another when the prices of each subsidy are the same, it would 
indicate a preference or an aversion towards one particular type of subsidy. If subjects are 
willing to pick grants, but not loans that are priced the same, then this would indicate the 
presence of loan aversion.  
We recognize that presenting subjects with similar effective prices does not guarantee that 
they will see it that way. In the eyes of participants, the effective price of a loan is in part 
subjective and linked to different perceptions regarding future interest rates and inflation rates. 
In order words, subject may see important differences in effective prices between grants and 
loans when these are in fact quite similar. The experiment attempted to limit these variations in 
subjects’  perceptions  by  reminding  them  of  current  interest  rates  and  proposing  plausible 
inflation rate scenarios in the material provided at the session. In the end, if large differences in 
preferences are observed, favouring grants versus loans at comparable prices, we could then 
attribute these differences to loan aversion.  
 
 
Perhaps some of the most interesting choices are those made by students at the margin, 
that is, those who are somewhat motivated to attend PSE, but may also be loan averse. They 
may vary their willingness to invest in PSE as a function of the financing options available – for 
example,  they  may  be  more  likely  to  choose  grants  over  cash,  but  cash  over  loans.  These 
decisions tell us how generous financial assistance needs to be in order to induce marginal 
participants to invest in PSE.  
To investigate whether some groups are less likely to borrow, after controlling for the price 
of educational subsidies, we relate the educational subsidy choices of participants to their vital 
characteristics collected from the baseline measures — socio-economic groups, numeracy level, 
risk  and  time  preference,  etc.  The  baseline  measures  include  demographics,  attitudes  and 
behaviours, (from the subject survey); socio-economic status and attitudes (from the parental 
survey);  a  numeracy  assessment  (from  the  numeracy  assessment),  and  measures  of  inter-
temporal and risk preferences (from the laboratory experiment).  
This comprehensive set of measures on resources, attitudes, behaviours, preferences and 
ability  provides  a  unique  opportunity  to  create  an  extremely  rich  data  set  describing  the 
characteristics of each participant.  
Student Survey 
Obtaining a good profile of the participants and their family context was essential to this 
study. Many relevant and excellent survey questions were adapted from the Youth in Transition 
Survey  (YITS),  Post  Secondary  Education  Survey  (PEPS)  and  Survey  of  Labour  and  Income 
Dynamics (SLID).
4 These data include measures on: educational ambitions,  expectations with 
regards to ambitions, perceived obstacles to pursuing PSE, financial means at student’s disposal, 
debt  aversion,  and  experience  with  debt,  educational  background,  educational  experiences, 
parent’s education and parent’s economic status. In addition, several other scales were included 
                                                           
4 These questions are available to duplicate at no charge as long as Statistics Canada is acknowledged as the source.  
 
 
to  assess  other  attitudes  and  behaviours  like  inter-temporal  orientation  (planning  ability), 
attitudes towards risk, aspiration level, engagement while in high school, perceptions of labour 
market conditions and perceptions of the cost of, and returns to, PSE. 
In  short,  we  attempted  to  include  as  many  as  possible  of  the  questions  on  personal 
characteristics, attitudes, or behaviours that have been shown in previous research to correlate 
with educational choice.  
Parental Survey 
Some of the questions asked of parents were redundant with the students survey, but 
provided more reliable data. Parents were interviewed by telephone for basic income 
information, educational background and expectations concerning their child’s educational 
achievement. 
Numeracy Assessment 
For many, the lack of basic literacy skills represents the most severe barrier to participation 
in education. Numeracy skills are often a gatekeeper for entrance into further education in 
many occupational areas and can critically affect employability and career options. Numeracy 
assessments typically involve the use of mathematics in real-life situations.
5 The results of this 
assessment provide a rough gauge of an individual’s overall literacy competencies and allow for 
investigation of the relationship between the readiness to learn and the decision to invest in 
learning. It is also possible to make comparisons between perceived and measured ability to 
learn.  
Measurement of preferences 
In  addition  to  survey  measures  providing  a  relevant  set  of  preferences  pertaining  to 
investment behaviours, we used the experimental sessions designed to capture the willingness 
                                                           
5 Numerate behaviour is observed when people manage a situation or solve a problem in a real context; it involves 
responding to information about mathematical ideas that may be represented in a range of ways; it requires the 
activation of a range of enabling knowledge, behaviours and processes. See Gal (2000).  
 
 
to take up different offers of financial aid to also collect inter-temporal and risk preferences 
using experimental techniques.  
1. Inter-temporal preferences 
In principle, time preference of an individual can be measured by offering a choice between 
two payments of different value to be made at different points in time. The later payment will 
have  a  greater  value  than  the  earlier  payment,  thereby  rewarding  the  subject  for  delaying 
gratification, i.e. rewarding saving. The payments depend on the size of the initial endowment, 
the rate of return to saving, the timing of the earlier payment and the waiting time for the later 
payment. (Eckel, Johnson, and Montmarquette, 2002 and 2005; Harrison et al., 2002) 
By varying these parameters and offering each respondent a set of binary choices, one can 
develop a comprehensive picture of each subject’s willingness to forgo smaller returns sooner 
for larger returns later. The set of time preference choices is summarized below in Table 1.  




Annualized Rates of 
Return 
% 







ONE MONTH, OR  
THREE MONTHS  
5  75.31  78.75 
10  75.63  82.50 
20  76.25  90.00 
50  78.13  112.50 
100  81.25  150.00 
200  87.50  225.00 
 
The earlier payment is consistently $75, paid on the date indicated, i.e., one day, one week, 
one month or three months from the time of the experiment. Participants have to choose 
between one of these “earlier payment” dates and a later payment amount (either a one month  
 
 
investment  period  or  a  one  year  investment  period).  One  month  and  three  month  earlier 
payments are included to test and control for possible hyperbolic discounting (see the papers in 
Loewenstein  et  al.,  2003).
  6  All  eight  decision  time  combinations  are  repeated  using  six 
annualized rates of return, as shown in the table. A broad range of rates of return is included 
because our previous results have suggested a great deal of variation in subject preferences (see 
Eckel  et  al.,  2005).  Finally,  decisions  involving  both  short  (one  month)  and  long  (one  year) 
investment periods are included.  
A person’s willingness to delay payment cannot be underestimated. In each of our previous 
studies, experimentally measured patience has explained a fair proportion of the variation in the 
outcomes  data:  willingness  to  invest  in  own  education,  willingness  to  invest  in  a  family 
member’s education and willingness to invest in long term savings. (See Eckel, Johnson, and 
Montmarquette, 2002; and Johnson, Montmarquette, and Eckel, 2003.) 
2. Attitudes towards risk 
Attitudes towards risk in a population play a key role in many models of economic and social 
behaviour, yet they are typically treated as unobserved characteristics in empirical analyses of 
individual decisions. Results from risk experiments conducted on college students (Eckel and 
Grossman, 2002; Holt and Laury, 2002), adults in Canada (see Johnson et al., 2004), and Houston 
high school students indicate substantial heterogeneity in responses. In the Canadian studies, 
these  responses  correlate  with  important  lifetime  decisions,  including  decisions  about 
investments in education. 
We used two sets of decisions under uncertainty. One set was a graphical representation of 
the  Holt  and  Laury  (2002)  10-binary  decision  instrument,  scaled  three  different  ways.  The 
                                                           
6 “Today” and “Tomorrow” early payoff choices are sometimes included to test for a possible confound, i.e., whether 
the experimenter is trusted by the subject to pay future amounts. If the subject doubts future payments, his choices will 
make him appear more impatient than he really is. In our earlier work with very similar instruments, we tested for 
trust effects by comparing results for today vs. one month and tomorrow vs. one month and find no significant 
difference. Thus there was no trust issue arising in our data at the time.  
 
 
second set was 5 graphical versions of the one out of six 50/50 gambles based on Eckel and 
Grossman (2008).
7  
An  individual’s  attitude  towards  risk  is  likely  to  vary  depending  on  the  decision-making 
domain  (e.g.,  investment  or  insurance,  health-related  behaviour,  social  risks)  and  will  also 
depend on whether the risk involves gains or losses. In the experimental component of the 
baseline measures, the focus was on risks related to abstract gambles, which are described as 
“cash payments with uncertain outcomes” to avoid any negative association with gambling. At 
the end of the session, if a risk decision was chosen for payment, the participant was asked to 
roll a fair die to determine the payoff for their chosen gamble.
8 
III. Implementation 
From October 2008 to March 2009 nearly 1250 Canadian students, mostly ranging in age 
from 16-18 years, participated in 75 experimental sessions. This sample was drawn from both 
urban and non-urban sites across Canada and was made up of full-time students, most of whom 
were enrolled in high school and some in CEGEP.  
Sample 
To generate meaningful comparisons by population group, the original project design called 
for 1400 respondents with the goal of recruiting a minimum of 200 participants per group of 
interest – high and low SES, aboriginals and rural vs. urban – in three or four different provinces. 
The 1248 teenaged students were recruited from across Canada, representing both rural and 
urban areas as well as low and middle income areas. Although not a focus of the stratified 
sampling strategy, special attention was paid to document immigrant students and students 
from single parent families for use in the analysis. A small number of participants over the age of 
18 were included primarily because one participating high school had adult learners who had 
                                                           
7 Details are available upon request 




returned to school. These older students represented approximately six per cent of the sample. 
Table 3.1 summarizes the numbers of participants in several groups of interest and by selected 
characteristics.  
Table 3.1: Participants 
Total Population = 1248 
Male  577 
Female  671 
Rural (U > 40 km)  152 
First Nations  110 
Low Income  218 
First Generation PSE  352 
Single Parent Family  123 
Work > 20 hours per week  794 
High School  948 
 
A  sample  of  non-urban  residents  was  recruited  to  compare  their  behaviours  to  urban 
residents. People in rural areas may face particular barriers to learning: transportation costs, 
lack of access to education providers, or simply reluctance to leave a community that they are 
deeply attached to. For many individuals in more remote areas the decision to pursue education 
may mean abandoning their social ties and a way of life that they cherish. 
The project design called for 400 participants from rural areas to allow meaningful analysis 
and  comparisons  between  rural  and  urban  behaviour.  For  the  purpose of  the  analysis,  this 
sample size would allow subgroups to be created that included one characteristic in addition to 
the rural/urban characteristic. Unfortunately, however, the recruitment efforts, summarized in 
the next subsection, were only able to attract 152 rural participants, defined as students whose  
 
 
permanent residences were located more than 40 km away from a university, although 244 
students could be classified as attending a school that met that criterion.
9 
Experimental Protocol 
The  experimental  sessions  were  held  in  controlled  environments  including  classrooms, 
libraries, career counselling rooms, activity rooms and auditoriums. All sessions were held on 
the campus where the student attended classes. As the demand for different session times in 
different  locations  varied,  a  total  of  75  sessions  were  conducted  with  50  as  the  maximum 
number of participants in any session.  
For showing up on time, each participant received a $20 show-up fee. This fee guaranteed 
that they would not leave the experiment empty-handed and allowed the experimenters to 
show the participants that they keep their word in terms of making promised payments. It also 
helped the participant to feel committed to finishing the experiment, and, most importantly, 
encouraged the participants to show up on time. 
All  participants  received  an  identification  number  to  protect  their  confidentiality. 
Participants were also reminded that this was a volunteer study, one that required their consent 
(Participant consent was obtained prior to filling out the web survey). During the introduction to 
the experiment, participants were told that they could earn substantially more than their show-
up fee by completing three parts of the study. The in-school session included the two remaining 
tasks: a set of real decisions about financial aid and the life skills assessment (numeracy).  
The  experimenter  provided  participants  with  appropriate  details  of  the  compensation 
available. This compensation included opportunities to receive both cash rewards (in the form 
of a check) and non-cash rewards in the form of educational financing. All participants were 
provided with the following information regarding the educational financing: 
                                                           
9 Only 46 participants lived 40 km away from any type of PSE institution, including CEGEP or community colleges.  
 
 
Grants — Educational grants will be disbursed if a participant enrols in an institution for 
learning or training full time within two years from the date of experiment participation.  
Loans — Educational loans will be disbursed if a participant enrols in an institution for 
learning or training full time. These loans will be available up to two years from the date 
of the experiment. The loans are repayable upon the completion of the study or if the 
participant drops out of the program of study. The interest rate floats and is set at the 
prime rate plus 2.5%.  
ICR loans — ICR educational loans were described as identical to the “loans” described 
above with the additional feature that repayment can be suspended, but not forgiven, if 
the income of the participant falls. 
Participants were advised that all types of support must be for direct or indirect expenses 
related to a program of study at an authorized institution. The financial support would only be 
awarded  if  the  participant,  not  a  family  member  or  friend,  enrolled  during  the  two  years 
following the experimental session. Additionally, any financial aid received through this study 
could not be disbursed to pay for past educational investments. 
To familiarize participants with the experimental decisions, 22 practice examples, one for 
each  kind  of  experimental  decision,  were  given  to  the  participants  before  they  began 
completing any of the real decisions. It was essential that they understood the nature of the 
decisions and how payment would be made. This practice was conducted with a lot of one-on-
one  help.  The  field  crew was  made  up  of  three  to  five  people on  hand  to  ensure  that  all 
participants got the attention they needed to complete the practice decisions and the actual 
choices during the experiment.   
In completing the actual choices, participants made a decision for each choice and, after all 
decisions  were  made,  one  decision  was  selected  at  random  for  each  participant  and  the 
participant received the payoff corresponding to the choice made for the selected decision.  
 
 
Participants  used  a  bingo  ball  cage  where  each  decision  number  was  matched  with  one 
corresponding numbered ping pong ball to randomly select the decision they would be paid for. 
Each decision had an equal probability of being selected, making decisions independent of each 
other. 
The experimental decisions were checked by the study staff while participants completed 
their numeracy assessments. Where necessary, participants were informed of missed decisions 
or  illegible  answers  so  that  they  could  answer  all  decisions  prior  to  the  random  selection 
process.  This  process  of  checking  was  instituted  primarily  to  ensure  that  all  experimental 
decisions were answered and to prevent the possibility of randomly selecting a decision for 
compensation where no choice had, in fact, been made. 
The  overall  experience  for  each  participant  was  scheduled  to  take  two  hours.  Some 
participants finished in as little as 1 hour 40 minutes, others took up to three hours to complete 
both parts. Although the numeracy assessment was estimated to take 30 minutes to complete, 
explicit instructions were provided to the experiment delivery team that participants should not 
be rushed to finish the assessment. In practice however, the numeracy assessment took far 
more than 30 minutes to complete for a majority of the participants.  
IV. Investigating the Demand for Educational Subsidies  
This section of the report takes a first look at the experimental choices made by subjects on 
the  types  of  financial  aid  offered.  We  begin  simply  by  observing  the  impact  of  the  design 
parameters -- cost per dollar of educational subsidy and type of subsidy -- on the number of 
students accepting educational subsidies. Using the costs per dollar of financial subsidy derived 
earlier and presented in Table 2.1, we can depict demand curves for financial aid by type of 
subsidies. In subsequent sections, we will investigate the determinants of this demand through 
multi-regression  analysis.  For  now,  we  limit  the  discussion  to  a  mere  description  of  the 
relationships between price and demand for different sub-groups and categories of subjects.   
 
 
Figure 4.1 depict the demand curve for financial aid resulting from the choices made by all 
participants to the experiment, with the proportion of respondents that chose education over a 
cash alternative by type of subsidy on the horizontal axis, and the cost per dollar of education 
subsidy, or the price of the subsidy, on the vertical axis. The set of choices presented here 
reflects a constant subsidy amount and allow the cash alternative to vary. For instance, starting 
at the left most point, 5.1 per cent of participants chose the option of a $2000 loan for PSE over 
a $700 cash alternative, 17.2 per cent chose a $2000 loan over a $300 cash alternative and 45.8 
per cent chose a $2000 loan over a $25 cash alternative, at respective prices of $0.94, $0.74, 
and $0.60 per dollar of loan subsidy. The decision numbers are noted in the graph for ease of 
comparison with decision characteristics and reported take-up proportions found in Table 2.1.  
Figure 4.1 
 
We  combine  nine  other  decisions  and  four  decisions  used  above  to  illustrate  another 
demand curve over the same price range. This time instead of allowing the cash alternative to 
vary, Figure 4.2 used a collection of decisions where the cash alternative is kept constant at  
 
 
$300, but the amount of subsidy offered vary. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 are plainly consistent with one 
another. Both figures show clearly that the price of the subsidy matters to participants. Both 
figures show downward sloping demand curves indicating that participants were mindful of the 
relative values of the different subsidies they were offered. 
Figure 4.2 
  
Whether  or  not  the  type  of  educational  subsidy  matters  is  to  be  investigated  more 
thoroughly in the analysis section. But for now, we can observe that demand for grants seems to 
lie slightly lower than offers of very low-priced loans (hybrids). One would expect the opposite, 
as one would thing a priori that, for a same price, grants would be more attractive than any 
types of financial aid including loans. As well, the addition of a set of decisions allowing for 
repayment of loans to be based on the ability to repay (ICR Loan Hybrid), seems to have a 
negligible impact on overall demand.    
We  now  turn  to  representations  of  the  demand  for  financial  aid  by  sub-groups  and 
individual  characteristics  to  flesh  out  some  more  basic  observations.  Given  that  both  
 
 
representations of the demand for financial aid are strikingly similar whether we keep the cash 
alternative constant (Figure 4.2) or the amount of subsidy constant (Figure 4.1), we will present 
the next set of descriptive results using one of these representations only.  
THE IMPACT BY POPULATION SUB-GROUP 
Figure 4.3 summarizes the demand for educational subsidies when the sample is split into 
rural and urban participants. The dark lines represent the demand by urban participants and the 
lighter gray lines represent the demand by rural participants. Urban participants are defined as 
those who live within 40 km of a university. There is hardly any difference in these respondents 
with respect to their behaviour for grants and low-priced loans (half grant/half loan). But there 
does  seem  to  be  a  larger  willingness  to  finance  education  with  loans  on  the  part  of  rural 
respondents. 
Figure 4.3 Educational Subsidy Demand by Geographical Proximity to a University 
 
Both parents and students were asked if they identified themselves as a Treaty Indian, 
Registered Indian or a member of an Indian Band/First Nation. If students responded yes to this 
question, they are identified as “First Nation” in Figure 4.4. All those that said no to this question  
 
 
are  identified  as  “Other”  and  their  responses  are  coded  with  light  gray  lines.  Those  who 
identified  as  First  Nation  have  across  the  board  noticeably  lower  demands  for  educational 
financing. 
Figure 4.4: Educational Subsidy Demand by Identifying as First Nation 
 
210 or 16.8 per cent of participants came from households with no PSE experience. Figure 
4.5  summarizes  the  demand  for  this  population  subgroup  with  the  black  lines  and  the 
subpopulation with PSE experience with the gray lines. The First Generation PSE sub-sample 
seems to be demanding much less education at prices less than $0.65 per dollar of educational 
financing as compared with their counterparts. 
Figure 4.5: Educational Subsidy Demand by First in Family to go to PSE  
 
 
  Many  of  the  traditional  groups  usually  known  for  lower  participation  in  PSE  show 
evidence of such lower participation in the simple demand curves constructed above. Students 
from low-income households, from households with no PSE experience, from Indian Band/First 
Nation  populations, all  exhibit,  to  some  extent,  lower willingness  to  invest in  PSE  than  the 
general  population.  Students  from  rural  areas  and  Immigrant  families  do  not  exhibit  these 
tendencies. The next part of this section examines how personal characteristics interact with the 
decision to invest. 
THE IMPACT OF INDIVIDUAL CHARACTERISTICS, BEHAVIORS AND ATTITUDES 
This study affords a rich array of data by which to categorize participants. The next  ** 
figures highlight some of the basic relationships found in that data, starting with basic individual 
differences and ending with more subtle attitudes and behaviours.  
Men and women respondents averaged the same response rate on one decision only – the 
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$2000 loan over the $700 cash alternative. (Upper left point on Figure 4.6.) At every other price, 
women express a much higher demand for student aid, and indirectly for PSE, than their male 
counterparts. 
Figure 4.6: Educational Subsidy Demand by Gender 
 
All  participants  completed  a  numeracy  assessment.  As  a  reminder,  numeracy  is  a 
combination of ability and skill level, not an intelligence test. Numeracy can be learned. The 
numeracy assessment was normalized to the Canadian population and each participant was 
awarded  a  score  between  0  and  500.  This  score  was  used  in  the  regressions  that  will  be 
discussed in the next sections. For a cursory look at the relationship between the demand for 
education and a subject’s numeracy skills, we subdivided the population into four groups: 0-200, 
200-300, 300-400 and 400-500. Over ninety per cent of the participants fall into the two middle 
categories. Participants with a score over 300 can be thought of as PSE ready.  
    
 
 




Clearly, as numeracy increases, so is the demand for financial aid to pursue PSE. The positive 
relationship between numerate ability and willingness to pursue PSE is only dwarfed by the 
relationship between willingness to save and willingness to pursue PSE (Figure 4.7). The title on 
each graph in Figure 4.7 roughly indicates the interest rate at which the participants could be 
induced to save for one year. The graphs are presented in order of increasing patience with the 
last graph summarizing the behaviour of the close to six per cent of the population that saved at 
every option. Participants willing to save and to postpone instant gratification are clearly 
inclined to express a much higher demand for PSE financing and studies. 
    
 
 








The study included several possible measures of attitude towards risk. We found a subtle 
and  positive  correlation  between  risk  aversion  and  demand  for  PSE,  but  none  of  those 
relationships merited a graphical representation here. We include a measure for risk in the 
multivariate analysis used in the next sections to see if the relationship holds.  
The next figure focuses specifically on student behaviour while in high school: grades. The 
positive relationship between grades and the demand for PSE is striking but not surprising. In 
Figure 4.8, the demand curves seem to walk across the page as we move from low grades, to 
medium grades and to high grades.  





The  next  two  figures  summarize  some  of  the  most  dramatic  relationships  between 
expectations and the demand for PSE financing. Approximately five per cent of the students in 
our sample expect to drop out of high school. This expectation manifests itself in a dramatically 
lower demand for PSE financing. 
Figure 4.9: Educational Subsidy Demand by Student’s Expectation to Dropout 
 
Empirically,  there  is  little  correlation  between  parent  expectations  and  outcomes  in 
investment in PSE by children. For this reason, we investigate the student’s perception of family 
expectations. Indeed, in our sample, nearly all parents surveyed, 92 per cent, expect their child  
 
 
to go on to PSE but only 78 per cent of students believed their family expected them to go on to 
PSE. When the sample is partitioned with respect to students’ beliefs regarding their family 
expectations, there is a striking separation of behaviour. The dark line segments in Figure 4.10 
represent the choices of those students who think their parents expect them to go to PSE. 
Nowhere do the two demand curves cross.  
Figure 4.10: Educational Subsidy Demand by Family Expectations (Student Survey) 
 
The final figure shows the relationship between experience with saving and demand for PSE 
financing.  Students were simply asked if they had ever saved any money for PSE. Those that 
claimed to have saved any money for PSE show a marked increase in the willingness to accept 
educational financing of all types.   
 
 
Figure 4.11: Educational Subsidy Demand by Personal Savings and No Savings for PSE 
 
The above figures show that many factors singularly influence the demand for education.  
What is very clear through the 12 figures is that every partition of the sample whether it is by 
subgroup, individual characteristics, behaviour, perceptions or attitudes, gives us a downward 
sloping demand for educational financing. This shows that the price of education is clearly a 
principle consideration in the willingness to participate in PSE. In the next section, we jointly 
analyze  simultaneously  the  many  potential  factors,  in  addition  to  price,  that  influence  the 
demand for PSE financing.  
V. Overall Demand for Educational Subsidies:  
What Matters?  
In this section, we use a regression framework to address what matters in the demand for 
student financial aid and to assess, in particular, the role played by different types of aid. We 
first  divide  the  participants  in  two  distinct  groups:  those  who  never  chose  an  educational 
subsidy, and those who show much interest by choosing educational subsides over cash in 
almost all decisions. After analyzing the characteristics of these two groups, we analyse what  
 
 
matters in the demand for educational subsidies for all participants. In Section 6, we tackle the 
question as to whether there is any systematic behaviour representing loan aversion among our 
subjects. 
Who is interested in PSE? 
Some 9 per cent of participants (113) never chose an educational subsidy offer. Even when 
such subsidy cost them as low as 2.5 cents per dollar of aid, these participants preferred cash.  
At the other spectrum, there are about 7% of participants (73) who chose education over cash 
offers either every time or almost every time (at least 21 times out of 22 opportunities).  
We use two probit models to investigate those who are either out of the market for PSE 
financing (NEVER) and those that take education consistently at least 21 times out of 22 (ALWAYS). 
Table  5.1  reports  the  results.  Note  that  for  each  model,  we  present  two  specifications. 
Specification 1 considers group variables only. Specification 2 adds individual characteristics, 
attitudes and behaviour variables. 
Table 5.1: Preference for Educational Subsidies 
   NEVER PSE  ALWAYS PSE 
Québec  -0.0402  -0.03  0.00109  -0.027 
   -0.18  -0.109  0.00442  -0.0956 
Manitoba  0.499***  0.684***  0.00684  -0.0538 
   2.919  3.306  0.0361  -0.254 
Saskatchewan  0.955***  0.849***  -0.913**  -0.935* 
   3.781  2.836  -1.998  -1.764 
Rural (Univ > 40 km)  0.285  0.318  0.215  0.272 
   1.568  1.488  1.109  1.248 
First Nation  0.134  -0.0635  -0.191  -0.129 
   0.777  -0.312  -0.789  -0.464 
Single Parent  0.218  0.304  0.0245  -0.111 
   1.295  1.558  0.118  -0.479 
Missing Value Single Parent  0.253  0.329  0.158  -0.00819 
   0.919  1.019  0.483  -0.0223 
First generation PSE  0.210*  0.0182  0.169  0.304** 
   1.797  0.131  1.269  2.025 
Immigrant  -0.244  -0.228  0.385*  0.468* 
   -1.031  -0.791  1.726  1.885  
 
 
Low Income (< 40K)  -0.112  -0.371  -0.134  0.00258 
   -0.705  -0.925  -0.744  0.00526 
Missing value Low Income   -0.102  -0.5  -0.351  -0.114 
   -0.383  -1.583  -1.062  -0.309 
Low Inc Montreal (renters)  0.336  0.456  -0.0854  -0.196 
   0.75  0.879  -0.161  -0.315 
CEGEP  0.0933  0.25  -0.233  -0.259 
   0.395  0.883  -0.87  -0.818 
Adult Student  -0.729**  -0.525  1.171**  1.291** 
   -2.228  -1.345  2.353  2.232 
Volunteer outside of class  0.0632  -0.0373  -0.0474  -0.0396 
   0.396  -0.2  -0.252  -0.188 
Female     -0.175     0.2 
      -1.368     1.39 
Numeracy     -0.0019     -0.000947 
      -1.641     -0.743 
Willingness to Save     -0.262***     0.143*** 
      -5.568     3.348 
Risk Seeking     -0.129***     0.0524 
      -3.249     1.201 
Risk Seeking X Low Income (< 40K)     0.0418     -0.0235 
      0.452     -0.227 
Grades 60 - 80     -0.379*     -0.295 
      -1.785     -0.71 
Grades > 80     -0.745***     -0.0313 
      -2.911     -0.0733 
Family expectation: Univ.     -0.452***     0.695*** 
      -3.462     2.917 
Peers not go to university     -0.0807     0.00251 
      -0.603     0.0154 
Obstacles to prevent PSE     0.0322     0.128 
      0.241     0.87 
Possibility drop out of HS     0.399     0.0849 
      1.6     0.202 
Skip Class (> once month)     -0.169     -0.165 
      -1.174     -1.005 
Works > 20 hrs per week     0.274**     -0.299** 
      1.972     -2.23 
Hesitant to undertake a university education b/c of the 
amount of debt      0.0138     -0.123 
      0.104     -0.79 
Organisation and planning     -0.0145***     0.00946** 
      -3.341     1.963 
Owns Credit Cards     -0.0812     -0.43 
      -0.371     -1.577 
Personal level of debt to be a burden     0.241     -0.00755 
      1.491     -0.0399  
 
 
Family’s level of debt to be a burden     0.0513     0.433*** 
      0.342     2.783 
Personal Savings for PSE     -0.275**     0.227 
      -2.076     1.617 
Constant  -1.804***  1.963***  -1.516***  -3.491*** 
   -8.865  2.927  -6.733  -4.201 
Pseudo R2   0.0664  0.2791  0.0346  0.1808 
Observations  1248  1248  1248  1248 
t-statistics presented below coefficient estimates. 
***: significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%: * significant at 10%. Two tail tests. 
The first model of Table 5.1 studies the determinants of those who never took a single 
educational  subsidy.  The  observed  corresponding  variable  to  the  latent  (unobserved)  “no 
preference for education” is 1 if the participant has refused all educational subsidy choices, that 
is always choosing the cash alternative for all the 22 choices, and zero otherwise. The Pseudo-R
2 
for both specifications, a measure of goodness of fit of the model, shows that the inclusion of 
individual variables is needed to obtain a relatively good fit. Therefore, we will only comment on 
the results of Specification 2 for the first model. Results show that there is a greater probability 
of a participant from Manitoba and Saskatchewan relative to participants from Québec and 
Ontario to show no preference for education. Similarly, students who work at least 20 hours per 
week in the labour market have a greater probability of never investing compared with their less 
labour market engaged peers. However, there is a long list of characteristics and behaviours that 
reduce the probability to never choose educational financing. Two exhibited behaviours include 
a WILLINGNESS TO SAVE ($75 for a year at various interest rates) and a willingness to take on more 
risk than their peers (RISK SEEKING). Additionally, those with high grades (averages above 80), 
high family expectations regarding their success at University, a good sense of organisation and 
planning, and personal savings for PSE all had a lower probability to never choose education.  
The second model moves our focus to the other end of the spectrum seeking to characterise 
those participants who consistently choose the educational subsidies alternatives over cash. In 
this probit model, the dependent variable is 1 if the participant has chosen at least 21 out of 22  
 
 
educational  subsidies  and  0  otherwise.  As  before,  the  specification  including  individual 
characteristics  yields  a  reasonably  good  fit.  Five  important  individual  factors  increase  the 
probability of being in the group of participants who consistently choose educational subsidies 
over cash: First Generation PSE. Adult students, immigrants, relatively more patient participants 
(WILLINGNESS  TO  SAVE),  students  who  are  encouraged  by  their  family  to  obtain  a  university 
education and students who consider the family’s level of debt to be a burden. But students 
from Saskatchewan, relative to other provinces, and students who declare working 20 hours or 
more while in school relative to those less engaged in the labour market are less likely to be 
among the group of individuals showing very strong preference for educational subsidies.  
The demand for educational subsidies: what matters? 
We now examine the participants’ willingness to take up educational financing controlling 
for the different subsidy forms, for prices of these financial instruments, group variables and 
individual and socioeconomic characteristics of the participants. 
The demand for educational subsidies is estimated within the context of a linear probability 
model. The pooling of the individuals choosing among 22 choices of educational financing vs. 
cash alternatives creates the opportunity to report an individual effect with GLS estimates. With 
1248  individuals  and  22  decisions,  the  total  amount  of  observations  available  to  conduct 
estimations is 27.456. The coefficients can be interpreted directly as marginal probabilities since 
this is a linear probability model. Specification 1 of Table 5.2 uses only the price variable in 
addition  to  the  usual  constant.  The  regression  coefficient  on  price  is  negative  and  highly 
significant. The demand for educational subsidies, or the willingness to give up a cash alternative 
in  favour  of  student  aid,  increases  as  the  price  of  the  subsidies  decreases.  Given  how 
parsimonious the specification is, the overall R
2 of 0.2465 indicates a nice fit.   
 
 
Specification 2 adds the subsidy type -- Grants, Loans, Hybrid -- with the Income Contingent 
Loan  hybrid  as  the  reference.  The  three  added  subsidy  type  variables  do  not  significantly 
increase the overall goodness of fit of the model (R
2 = 0.2557) relative to the first specification. 
In other words, relative to price, the subsidy types do not explain very much of the demand for 
educational financing.  
With Specification 3, we assume that the subsidy types not only affect the intercepts of the 
demand curve, but also the slope.
10 Through these two effects (Subsidy and Price x Subsidy), we 
can see that a grant subsidy generates more demand than loans only when the price per dollar 
of subsidy is above 42 cents.
11 The price per dollar of funding must reach a relatively high level 
before a significant difference on the demand for educational financing occurs between the two 
forms of subsidy in favour of grants. Compare to Specification 1, the overall R
2 increases by 8.7 
per cent, reaching 0.2680.  
Table 5.2: The demand for educational subsidies  
   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5 
Price  -0.973***  -0.986***  -1.469***  -1.491***  -1.425*** 
   -121.5  -89.06  -51.29  -51.59  -43.02 
Grant     -0.106***  -0.406***  -0.406***  -0.406*** 
      -17.59  -26.18  -26.2  -26.31 
Price x Grant        0.715***  0.715***  0.715*** 
         22.38  22.4  22.5 
Loan     -0.0951***  -0.282***  -0.282***  -0.282*** 
      -14.12  -9.714  -9.724  -9.765 
Price x Loan        0.420***  0.420***  0.552*** 
         9.729  9.74  12.53 
Hybrid     -0.0101*  -0.0418**  -0.0418**  -0.0418** 
      -1.687  -2.031  -2.033  -2.042 
Price x Hybrid        0.0651  0.0651  0.0651 
         1.608  1.61  1.617 
Québec           -0.0411  -0.0375 
            -1.286  -1.357 
                                                           
10 There is practically no difference in behavior between the hybrid loan and an ICL-hybrid loan, the reference 
variable. 
11 The differential effect on the demand for education between a grant and a loan is: (-0.406 + 0.715 x Price of $1 
funding) - (-0.282 + 0.420 x Price of $1 funding). The differential is positive if Price is greater than 42 cents per 
dollar of educational financing.  
 
 
Manitoba           -0.0709***  -0.0755*** 
            -2.75  -3.516 
Saskatchewan           -0.317***  -0.237*** 
            -7.305  -6.394 
Price x Saskatchewan           0.163***  0.134*** 
            6.86  5.558 
Rural (Univ > 40 km)           -0.0143  -0.0115 
            -0.517  -0.497 
First Nation           -0.112***  -0.0559** 
            -3.562  -2.045 
Price x First Nation           0.0506*  0.0329 
            1.801  1.171 
Single Parent           -0.0291  -0.0420* 
            -1.073  -1.866 
Missing Value Single Parent           0.0134  0.00629 
            0.324  0.183 
First generation PSE           -0.0391**  -0.00401 
            -2.171  -0.266 
Immigrant           0.120***  0.117*** 
            3.293  3.685 
Price x Immigrant           -0.0634**  -0.0731** 
            -1.975  -2.27 
Low Income (< 40K)           -0.0153  -0.0385 
            -0.65  -0.828 
Missing value Low Income            -0.0275  0.0304 
            -0.698  0.927 
Low Inc Montreal (renters)           -0.0128  -0.00815 
            -0.199  -0.152 
CEGEP           -0.00782  -0.0288 
            -0.234  -0.994 
Adult Student           0.203***  0.134*** 
            3.783  2.995 
Volunteer outside of class           -0.0221  -0.0147 
            -0.859  -0.69 
Female              0.0558*** 
               4.126 
Numeracy              0.000202 
               1.625 
Willingness to Save              0.0631*** 
               14.63 
Price x Willingness to Save x Loan              -0.0523*** 
               -13.9 
Risk Seeking              0.00974** 
               2.36 
Risk Seeking X Low Income (< 40K)              0.0105 
               1.055  
 
 
Grades 60 - 80              -0.0142 
               -0.45 
Grades > 80              0.0607* 
               1.779 
Family expectation: Univ.              0.124*** 
               6.893 
Price x Family expectation               -0.0743*** 
               -4.082 
Peers not go to university              0.00918 
               0.618 
Obstacles to prevent PSE              -0.0016 
               -0.114 
Possibility drop out of HS              -0.0548 
               -1.626 
Skip Class (> once month)              -0.0317* 
               -1.868 
Price x Skip Class              0.00424 
               0.258 
Works > 20 hrs per week              -0.0413*** 
               -3.009 
Hesitant to undertake a university 
education b/c of the amount of 
debt               0.00742 
               0.443 
Price x Debt (Hesitant…)              -0.0186 
               -1.109 
Organisation and planning              0.00255*** 
               5.576 
Owns Credit Cards              0.0164 
               0.759 
Personal level of debt to be a 
burden              -0.0381** 
               -2.022 
Family’s level of debt to be a 
burden              0.0307* 
               1.887 
Personal Savings for PSE              0.0482*** 
               3.556 
Constant  1.002***  1.066***  1.301***  1.406***  0.738*** 
   113.3  103.5  78.98  41.6  9.793 
Rho  0.3921  0.3976  0.405  0.3906  0.2971 
Overall R-sq  0.2465  0.2557  0.268  0.2904  0.3923 
Observations  27456  27456  27456  27456  27456 
Number of students  1248  1248  1248  1248  1248 
t-statistics presented below coefficients. 




With Specification 4, group variables are added to the subsidy variables of Specification 3. 
There is little impact on the coefficients of the subsidy and price variables, meaning that the 
specification is robust. Participants from Manitoba and in particular Saskatchewan demand less 
educational financing than participants from other provinces. FIRST NATION participants reveal a 
lower demand for educational financing. This is also the case for First Generation students. 
Adult  students  and  immigrant  demand  more  educational  financing  than  their  counterparts. 
However, these 18 group variables add little to the goodness of fit measure with a new R
2 of 
0.2994 (compared with 0.2680 for Specification 3).  
The  overall  R
2  increases  substantially  to  0.3923  with  Specification  5.  We  add  over  20 
individual  characteristics  to  the  variables  used  in  Specification  4.  Again,  the  results  on  the 
subsidy  and  price  variables  remain  robust.  Among  the  group  variables,  participants  from 
Manitoba and Saskatchewan and the FIRST NATION subgroup invest less in educational subsidies 
relatively to others while immigrants and older student invest more. Female students invest 
more than males. A key variable in terms of effect and statistical importance is the willingness to 
save: more patient participants invest significantly more in education. Also risk seeking students 
invest more in education. Showing a good sense of organisation and planning, already saving for 
one’s  education  increases  the  probability  of  investing  in  educational  subsidies.  Participants 
working  20  hours  or  more  while  in  school  invest  less  in  education  relatively  to  those  less 
engaged in the labour market. Feeling that the level of debt is a burden negatively affects the 
demand for education.   
Some cross variables between subsidy characteristics and individual characteristics were 
included  in  Specification  5.  The  negative  coefficient  estimate  of  the  cross-variable  PRICE  X 
WILLINGNESS TO SAVE X LOAN indicates that when a loan is involved, less patient participants react 
less to a price increase than more patient students. The less patient participants discount more  
 
 
the future repayment of the loan than their more patient counterparts. We note the negative 
coefficient estimate in the cross variable PRICE X FAMILY EXPECTATION. 
 In the results presented thus far, there is little evidence that debt aversion exists. The 
different categories of subsidies have little effect on the demand for educational subsidies. The 
only significant variable leading in that direction is the ¨feeling that the personal level of debt is 
a  burden¨  while  the  variable  ¨hesitant  to  undertake  a  university  education  because  of  the 
amount of debt¨ and few related others are insignificant. The next section further examines the 
presence of systematic debt averse individuals in the sample. 
VI. Loan aversion 
We  noted  in  the  previous  section  that  once  the  price  of  the  educational  subsidy  is 
accounted for, demand for student financial aid is not much affected by the type of aid, and the 
family  level of  debt  actually  influence  financial  aid  take-up  positively,  the  opposite of  debt 
aversion. Participants were asked if their personal level of debt was a burden. This variable was 
found, however, significant in the complete specification of the model with all the other factors 
taken into account. Indeed, in the descriptive statistics, this variable seemed to split the sample 
with lower demand for those who felt such a burden, especially at low prices. In this section, we 
attempt to isolate a sub sample of the participants that seem to behave in a particularly loan 
averse way.  
By design, a participant who always chose a grant and never a loan is insensitive to prices 
and completely sensitive to subsidy type. This behaviour appears consistent with a truly loan 
averse participant: the participant clearly cares for PSE since grants are always accepted over 
cash,  but  he  or  she  has  no  willingness  to  borrow  to  meet  the  same  aim.  Among  the 
1248 participants in our study, 152 or 12.2% of them made exactly that choice. For ease of 
discussion, let’s call this sub sample “strictly grant seeking.” Who are these participants?   
 
 
We use a probit regression where the dependent variable is 1 if the participant always 
chooses  grants  but  never  a  loan  and  0  otherwise.  The  results  are  presented  in  Table  6.1. 
Specification  1  considers  group  variables  only.  Specification  2  adds  individual  variables  to 
Specification 1. The Pseudo-R
2 for both specifications shows that the inclusion of individual 
variables is needed to obtain a relatively good fit. Therefore, we will only comment on the 
results of Specification 2. 
Table 6.1: The probability of choosing always grant and never loan 
   Model 1  Model 2 
Variable  Group variables  + Individual char. 
Québec  0.0414  0.0967 
   0.208  0.442 
Manitoba  0.0898  0.0789 
   0.606  0.497 
Saskatchewan  -0.303  -0.159 
   -1.087  -0.532 
Rural (Univ > 40 km)  -0.239  -0.226 
   -1.338  -1.195 
First Nation  -0.497**  -0.405* 
   -2.223  -1.744 
Single Parent  -0.196  -0.178 
   -1.07  -0.913 
Missing Value Single Parent  -0.233  -0.277 
   -0.926  -1.025 
First generation PSE  -0.318***  -0.254** 
   -2.671  -1.987 
Immigrant  -0.0339  -0.0409 
   -0.163  -0.189 
Low Income (< 40K)  -0.083  0.011 
   -0.54  0.0281 
Missing value Low Income   0.215  0.308 
   0.936  1.224 
Low Inc Montreal (renters)  -0.918*  -0.918* 
   -1.79  -1.677 
CEGEP  -0.117  -0.2 
   -0.557  -0.86 
Adult Student  -0.077  -0.317 
   -0.195  -0.72 
Volunteer outside of class  0.156  0.214 
   1.032  1.331 
Female     0.155 
      1.453  
 
 
Numeracy     -0.000206 
      -0.211 
Willingness to Save     0.0754** 
      2.351 
Risk Seeking     -0.0178 
      -0.555 
Risk Seeking X Low Income (< 40K)     0.00896 
      0.106 
Grades 60 - 80     -0.134 
      -0.435 
Grades > 80     0.227 
      0.71 
Family expectation: Univ.     0.418*** 
      2.898 
Peers not go to university     0.0654 
      0.542 
Obstacles to prevent PSE     -0.0681 
      -0.63 
Possibility drop out of HS     -0.750* 
      -1.649 
Skip Class (> once month)     -0.109 
      -0.907 
Works > 20 hrs per week     0.0953 
      0.906 
Hesitant to undertake a university education b/c of the amount 
of debt      -0.0837 
      -0.699 
Organisation and planning     0.000134 
      0.0375 
Owns Credit Cards     0.265* 
      1.694 
Personal level of debt to be a burden     -0.0706 
      -0.435 
Family’s level of debt to be a burden     -0.205 
      -1.506 
Personal Savings for PSE     0.282*** 
      2.689 
Constant  -1.096***  -1.842*** 
   -6.171  -3.06 
Pseudo R2   0.0386  0.1212 
Observations  1248  1248 
t-statistics presented below coefficient estimates. 
***: significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%: * significant at 10%. Two tail tests. 
The probability of being STRICTLY GRANT SEEKING (jointly always accepting a grant and never a 
loan) is lower for first generation PSE participants. It is also lower for a FIRST NATION person, for a  
 
 
low  income  participant  from  Montréal  and  for  the  high  school  student  considering  the 
probability to drop out. The probability is higher for those students who are patient (WILLINGNESS 
TO SAVE), benefit from the support of the family (FAMILY EXPECTATION: UNIV), have already saved 
for the post secondary education and own credits cards.  
These results can hardly support the idea that student loans keep at-risk students from 
investing in education. If the probability of being  STRICTLY GRANT SEEKING were higher for FIRST 
NATION participants, those from a low income or a first generation PSE family and who expect to 
drop out then there would be reason to believe in the presence of debt aversion. As it is, these 
four  at-risk  groups  are  less  likely  to  be  categorized  as  STRICTLY  GRANT  SEEKING.  The  positive 
coefficients estimates of the other variables are also puzzling. All these variables, Willingness to 
Save, Family Expectation: Univ, Personal savings for PSE, are showing a consistent positive effect 
on the probability of being STRICTLY GRANT SEEKING. One potential explanation is that for some 
participants a loan is not needed to pursue PSE, but a grant, no matter the price, is always 
welcome. This could be the case of participants who can rely on other sources of financing than 
student financial aid to pursue PSE, such as parent’s income. 
Owning credit cards and choosing all grants but never a loan is hardly consistent with loan 
aversion either as it is difficult to explain why a person would be averse to debt for educational 
investment but not for generalized debt. However this credit card result is consistent with Prelec 
and Loewenstein’s (1998) prediction of debt aversion in situations of planned (student loans) 
and unplanned debt (credit cards). Basically, they predict using the assumptions of prospective 
accounting and coupling that individuals will take on debt in emergency like situations (credit 
cards) but when they think about taking on debt, even for investment purposes, the thought of 
paying the loan back after consumption (investment) has occurred will cause people to take on 
planned debt less often.   
 
 
Loan averse or lower preference for education?  
They are only 40 participants (3.21%) choosing always the cash option when the alternative has 
a loan component but taking at least a grant choice. We have potentially loan averse people 
with heterogeneous and weaker preferences for education than the subgroup discussed 
above
12. 
Table 6.2: The probability of choosing at least a grant but never a loan component 
  
Model 1  
Group variables 
Model 2  
+ Individuals char. 
Québec  -0.0722  -0.134 
   -0.207  -0.322 
Manitoba  0.368  0.452* 
   1.541  1.695 
Saskatchewan  1.076***  1.222*** 
   3.045  3.00 
Rural (Univ > 40 km)  -0.0754  0.0107 
   -0.241  0.0295 
First Nation  -0.435  -0.705* 
   -1.363  -1.93 
Single Parent  -0.134  -0.00823 
   -0.487  -0.0284 
Missing Value Single Parent  -0.179  -0.239 
   -0.459  -0.529 
First generation PSE  0.133  0.134 
   0.819  0.741 
Immigrant  -0.149  -0.329 
   -0.45  -0.844 
Low Income (< 40K)  -0.165  1.280** 
   -0.669  2.208 
Missing value Low Income   -0.074  -0.144 
   -0.203  -0.348 
Low Inc Montreal (renters)  0.374  0.216 
   0.617  0.31 
CEGEP  0.332  0.593 
   0.955  1.421 
Adult Student  -0.326  -0.0701 
   -0.762  -0.142 
Volunteer outside of class  0.275  0.426 
   1.107  1.514 
                                                           
12 In the following probit regressions, the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the participant has always 
taken the cash for all choices with a loan component (D109-123) and took a grant at least one time (D124-
D130); 0 otherwise.  
 
 
Female     -0.0603 
      -0.353 
Numeracy     -0.00208 
      -1.37 
Willingness to Save     -0.211*** 
      -3.623 
Risk Seeking     0.0589 
      1.158 
Risk Seeking X Low Income (< 40K)     -0.378** 
      -2.216 
Grades 60 - 80     0.4 
      1.027 
Grades > 80     0.762* 
      1.799 
Family expectation: Univ.     -0.0947 
      -0.514 
Peers not go to university     -0.129 
      -0.661 
Obstacles to prevent PSE     0.174 
      0.984 
Possibility drop out of HS     0.136 
      0.34 
Skip Class (> once month)     0.0931 
      0.499 
Works > 20 hrs per week     -0.0176 
      -0.1 
Hesitant to undertake a university education b/c of the amount 
of debt      -0.259 
      -1.342 
Organisation and planning     -0.00487 
      -0.814 
Owns Credit Cards     -0.474 
      -1.343 
Personal level of debt to be a burden     -0.03 
      -0.124 
Family’s level of debt to be a burden     -0.485* 
      -1.871 
Personal Savings for PSE     -0.338* 
      -1.844 
Constant  -2.309***  -1.433 
   -7.658  -1.54 
Pseudo R2   0.0618  0.1856 
Observations  1248  1248 
t-statistics presented below coefficient estimates. 




The results show two strong group variables at play: students from Saskatchewan and from 
low income household are likely to be member of this subgroup. However, for low income 
participants the probability of being part of this group decreases when they are risk seeking. 
Participants with a willingness to save are less likely to refuse a subsidy with a loan component 
but choosing at least one grant offer. In light of those results it is more the case that these 
people have express lower preference for education than they are loan averse.  
VII. Discussion 
Price emerges as the key determinant in the demand for educational subsidies, with the 
different forms of subsidies little explanatory power.  
At  the  group  level,  being  an  immigrant  is  a  particularly  important  factor  to  positively 
influence  the  demand  for  educational  subsidies,  while  being  from  a  First  Nation  family 
depresses this demand.  
Among individual characteristics, participants showing patience (WILLINGNESS TO SAVE) is the 
key factor to predict who is likely to invest in educational subsidies. Investing requires patience. 
There  is  some  practiced  anticipation  before  reaping  the  reward  of  the  investment.  Family 
expectations, risk seeking students and good grades were also the factors that characterize the 
participants showing a positive preference for educational finance.  
What happened to our measures of NUMERACY? Why did they not enter into the regressions 
models  in  a  convincing  way?  In  fact,  numeracy  is  correlated  with  many  variables.  Most 
importantly,  NUMERACY  is  positively  correlated  with  WILLINGNESS  TO  SAVE  and  good  grades. 
NUMERACY and having a member of the immediate family attend PSE (complement to FIRST GEN 
PSE) correlate. NUMERACY and PERSONAL SAVINGS FOR PSE correlate. And those in the FIRST NATION  
 
 
subgroup had no representation on the high end of the  NUMERACY score.
13 The relationship 
between WILLINGNESS TO SAVE and NUMERACY deserves further attention.  
All and all, our findings do not support the idea that loan aversion is a barrier for particular 
subgroups, especially at risk groups represented in our sample.  
The key finding of this study is: Price matters. Since the price matters so much in explaining 
the  demand  for  educational  subsidies,  it  suggests  an  obvious  policy  tool  to  attract  more 
students  in  PSE.  The  answer  is  a  simple  one:  decrease  the  cost  of  accepting  educational 
subsidies. Loans can be further subsidized as we did in this study by pairing them with grants. 
Larger loans are more heavily subsidized than small loans. Loans could be in part forgiven. More 
grants could be given to aspiring students and graduates. Any of these suggestions would lower 
the cost of educational subsidies to the receiver, but not to the donor. 
A complementary line of policy instruments to “lowering the price” could be to bolster the 
“willingness to pay” for education. A slew of policies already in place works towards this aim. 
Correcting misperceptions about returns to education in general, pointing to the stability of 
employment with a tertiary degree, and the increase in opportunities available to university 
graduates are all included in PSE promotional materials. The benefits to university education are 
found across the board, for young and old learners as well as for all racial and ethnic groups. 
An  individual  characteristic  that  increases  the  willingness  to  pay  for  education  is  an 
individual’s  willingness  to  invest  in  general.  What  developmental  factors  encourage  good 
savings behaviour in general? Does attaining good numeracy skills as an adolescent increase the 
likelihood of good investment behaviour as an adult? There has not been enough research in 
this area to establish a causal connection. 
                                                           
13 In our sample 72% of our participants declared that one of their parents had postsecondary education and among 
those scoring greater than 400 on the numeracy assessment, 87% have at least a parent with PSE. 80% of those 
scoring 400+ on the numeracy test recognize the support of their parents for a university education while they 
represent 74% of the total sample. 45.67% of participants declared saving for their education and they are 
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